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CAMPBELL AT 21/SONY AT 31
Jessica Litman*
Abstract: When copyright lawyers gather to discuss fair use, the most common refrain is its
alarming expansion. Their distress about fair use’s enlarged footprint seems completely untethered
from any appreciation of the remarkable increase in exclusive copyright rights. In the nearly forty
years since Congress enacted the 1976 copyright act, the rights of copyright owners have expanded
markedly. Copyright owners’ demands for further expansion continue unabated. Meanwhile, they
raise strident objections to proposals to add new privileges and exceptions to the statute to shelter
non-infringing uses that might be implicated by their expanded rights. Copyright owners have used
the resulting uncertainty over the scope of liability for new uses to litigate some new businesses into
bankruptcy before their legality could be determined. These developments push fair use to shelter
new uses and users. When lawyers for copyright owners complain that fair use has stretched beyond
their expectations, they fail to acknowledge their own responsibility for its growth. This Article
takes up these questions with particular attention to the thirty-one-year-old decision in Sony v.
Universal Studios, and Congress’s assumptions about individual and contributory liability for
personal copying before and after the Sony case.

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................ 651!
I.! A SURPRISING LAWSUIT ........................................................ 655!
II.! WHAT WE LEARN FROM THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY .. 657!
III.! SONY AND ITS AFTERMATH .................................................. 663!
IV.! FAIR USE AND CAMPBELL V. ACUFF-ROSE ........................ 672!
V.! PERSONAL USES, CONTRIBUTORY LIABILITY, AND
CONGRESS ................................................................................. 674!
CONCLUSION..................................................................................... 683
INTRODUCTION
The occasion for this symposium is that Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc.1 had its twenty-first birthday earlier this year, and has
therefore achieved its majority. We’ve been invited to examine
Campbell’s “profound influence on fair use.”2 When the Court handed
down the Campbell decision twenty-one years ago, the opinion garnered

* John F. Nickoll Professor of Law and Professor of Information, University of Michigan. Jon
Weinberg’s comments on earlier drafts greatly improved this Article.
1. 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
2. Symposia, WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW, http://www.law.uw.edu/wlr/symposia (last visited May
10, 2015).
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generally positive reviews.3 More recently, the decision, or its
application by lower courts, has inspired significant criticism. The most
common complaint is that Campbell’s instruction to focus on the
transformativeness of defendant’s use has given lower courts license to
find a use fair whenever they are so inclined.4
When copyright lawyers gather to discuss fair use these days, the
most common refrain is its alarming expansion.5 This distress about fair
use’s enlarged footprint seems completely untethered from any
appreciation of the remarkable increase in exclusive copyright rights. It’s
uncontroversial that the scope of U.S. copyright has expanded in the past
fifty years.6 It covers a broader array of copyrightable subject matter.7 It
lasts longer.8 It grants owners additional rights.9 Court decisions have

3. See, e.g., Pierre N. Leval, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose: Justice Souter’s Rescue of Fair Use, 13
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 19 (1994); The Supreme Court, 1993 Term: Leading Cases, 108 HARV.
L. REV. 139, 331–41 (1994).
4. See, e.g., Matthew D. Bunker & Clay Calvert, The Jurisprudence of Transformation:
Intellectual Incoherence and Doctrinal Murkiness Twenty Years After Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, 12 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 92 (2014); William Henslee, You Can’t Always Get What You
Want, But If You Try Sometimes You Can Steal It and Call It Fair Use: A Proposal to Abolish the
Fair Use Defense for Music, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 663 (2009); Edward E. Weiman, Transforming
Use: The Google Books Cases Have Created a New Area of Controversy Regarding the
Transformative Use Defense to Copyright Infringement, L.A. LAW., June 2014, at 16–20.
5. See, e.g., LIBRARY OF CONG., ORPHAN WORKS AND MASS DIGITIZATION ROUNDTABLES 39–
40 (2014) (remarks of June Besek), available at http://copyright.gov/orphan/transcript/
0310LOC.pdf; The Scope of Fair Use: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop.,
& the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 13–22 (2014) [hereinafter Scope of
Fair Use Hearing] (testimony of June Besek, Columbia Law School); id. at 118–22 (prepared
statement of Victor Perlman, American Society of Media Photographers); id. at 127, 130–33
(statement submitted by the Copyright Alliance); Terry Hart, Fox News v. TVEyes: Fair Use
Transformed, COPYHYPE (Sept. 16, 2014), http://www.copyhype.com/2014/09/fox-news-v-tveyesfair-use-transformed/; The Copyright Soc’y of the U.S.A., N.Y. Chapter, Content Aggregation: Fair
Use or a Use Too Far?, PUNKCAST.COM (Oct. 24, 2013), http://punkcast.com/2534/2534/
2534_csusa_content_aggregation.mp4; The Copyright Soc’y of the U.S.A., N.Y. Chapter, If I Ran
the Zoo: Probing the Contours of “The Next Great Copyright Act” (Mar. 26, 2014),
http://media.csusa.org/chapters_new_york_video_15.html; see also Jane C. Ginsburg, Letter from
the US: Exclusive Rights, Exceptions, and Uncertain Compliance with International Norms – Part
II (fair use), REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D’AUTEUR (RIDA) (forthcoming Jan. 2015)
(claiming that recent fair use decisions violate international norms); Paul Goldstein, Fair Use in
Context, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 433, 438 (2008) (claiming that the fair use analyses in the Sony
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984), Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling
Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006), and Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d
1146 (9th Cir. 2007) cases violate the Berne Convention’s minimum standards).
6. See, e.g., Neil Weinstock Netanel, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 54–80 (2008).
7. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012), with Act of March 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 5, 35
Stat. 1075, 1076, and Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 102(a), 90 Stat. 2541, 2544–45.
8. Compare 17 U.S.C. §§ 302, 303, 304, with Act of March 4, 1909, §§ 23, 24, 35 Stat. at 1080–
81, and Copyright Act of 1976, §§ 302, 303, 304, 90 Stat. at 2572–76.
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expanded the scope of traditional copyright rights.10 Congress has
greatly enhanced the remedies for infringement.11 Individuals and
organizations supporting strong copyright laws applaud these
expansions.12 These same interests express surprise and dismay that,
over the past fifty years, the fair use privilege has come to shelter a
broader range of uses.13
I have no reason to doubt the sincerity of those expressions of dismay.
The idea, though, that copyright owners’ rights could be greatly inflated
without inspiring a comparable expansion in fair use seems delusive. If
many, many more uses are arguably prima facie infringing now than
before, it follows that fair use will need to stretch to permit more of
them. None of the voices expressing the hope that fair use could be
confined or returned to its mid-twentieth century boundaries seem to
endorse a proposal to cut back copyright rights to their mid-twentieth

9. Compare 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 106A, 1006, 1201, 1202, with Act of March 4, 1909, § 1, 35 Stat.
at 1075 and Copyright Act of 1976, § 106, 90 Stat. at 2546.
10. See, e.g., Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 800–05 (6th Cir. 2005);
Hotaling v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 118 F.3d 199, 201 (4th Cir. 1997); MAI
Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518–20 (9th Cir. 1993); see generally Jessica
Litman, Billowing White Goo, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 587 (2008).
11. Compare 17 USC §§ 502–505, with Act of March 4, 1909, § 25, 35 Stat. at 1081–82, and
Copyright Act of 1976, §§ 502–505, 90 Stat. at 2541–86.
12. See, e.g., ALLAN ADLER, ASS’N OF AM. PUBLISHERS, INC. RE: REQUEST FOR COMMENT ON
GREEN PAPER, COPYRIGHT POLICY, CREATIVITY, AND INNOVATION IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY
(Nov. 13, 2013), available at http://www.publishers.org/_attachments/docs/copyright_policy/
aapgreenpaperc111313.pdf; AM. SOC’Y OF COMPOSERS, AUTHORS & PUBLISHERS, REQUEST FOR
COMMENTS ON DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE GREEN PAPER, COPYRIGHT POLICY, CREATIVITY, AND
INNOVATION IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY (Nov. 15, 2013), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/
files/ntia/ascap_comments.pdf; MICHAEL O’LEARY, MOTION PICTURE ASS’N OF AM., IN THE
MATTER OF REQUEST FOR COMMENTS ON DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE GREEN PAPER, COPYRIGHT
POLICY, CREATIVITY, AND INNOVATION IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY (Nov. 13, 2013), available at
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/motion_picture_association_of_
america_comments.pdf; Jane C. Ginsburg, The Pros and Cons of Strengthening Intellectual
Property Protection: Technological Protection Measures and Section 1201 of the United States
Copyright Act, 16 INFO. & COMM. TECH. L. 191 (2007).
13. See, e.g., Scope of Fair Use Hearing, supra note 5, at 13–14 (testimony of June Besek,
Columbia Law School); id. at 104, 109–11 (Association of American Publishers statement
submitted for the hearing record); Copyright Issues in Education and for the Visually Impaired:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop., & the Internet of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 113th Cong. 13–14 (2014) [hereinafter Copyright Issues in Education and for the
Visually Impaired] (statement of Allan Robert Adler, General Counsel, Association of American
Publishers); Hart, supra note 5; Raymond Nimmer, “Transformative Fair Use” Compared to
“Transformative Purpose Infringement”, Some Cases Get this Totally Wrong Including in Google
Books, CONTEMP. INTELL. PROP., LICENSING & INFO. L. BLOG (Mar. 22, 2014),
http://www.ipinfoblog.com/archives/389731-print.html; see also Ginsburg, supra note 5, at 22
(“The U.S. fair use doctrine is seeming rather cavernous of late.”).

08 - Litman_post final author review 06.04.15.doc (Do Not Delete)

654

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

6/4/15 11:45 AM

[Vol. 90:651

century limits.14 They have been steadfast in insisting that it would be
dangerous to allow Congress to consider balancing expanded copyright
with appropriately expanded express limitations and exceptions.15 They
urge, nonetheless, that fair use must be narrowly contained.16
If Campbell is twenty-one years old, that means that another Supreme
Court fair use case, Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios,17 had
its thirty-first birthday in January. Some copyright lawyers with long
memories identify Sony as the Supreme Court case in which fair use
started to go wrong.18
14. See, e.g., Scope of Fair Use Hearing, supra note 5, at 127, 129 (statement submitted by the
Copyright Alliance).
15. See, e.g., First Sale Under Title 17: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual
Prop., & the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 108 (2014) [hereinafter 2014
First Sale Under Title 17 Hearing] (testimony of Emery Simon, Counselor, BSA, The Software
Alliance) (arguing that expanding first sale doctrine “would upturn a cornerstone of our economy,
our ability to contract and our ability to rely on contracts”); Digital Millennium Copyright Act
Section 104 Report: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts & Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 18 (2001) [hereinafter 2001 Section 104 Report Hearing] (statement
of Carey Ramos, National Music Publishers Association) (claiming the Register’s recommendation
to enact an exemption for buffer copies would adversely affect music sales); id. at 25 (statement of
Cary Sherman, Senior Executive Vice President and General Counsel, Recording Industry
Association of America, Inc.) (claiming that expanding first sale doctrine “would undermine the
fundamental objectives of the Copyright Act”); id. at 46 (statement of Emery Simon, Counsel,
Business Software Alliance) (arguing that “temporary copy exceptions . . . would create
uncertainty” and suppress the growth of e-commerce); id. at 76 (statement of Marvin Berenson,
Senior Vice President and General Counsel, Broadcast Music Inc.) (arguing that the Register’s
recommended exemptions “would adversely affect the rights of songwriters” and characterizing her
analysis as “flawed, outside the scope of the inquiry, and not supported by the record”); see also
sources cited supra note 11.
16. See, e.g., Copyright Issues in Education and for the Visually Impaired, supra note 13, at 13–
14 (statement of Allen Robert Adler for the Association of American Publishers); Zehra Abdi,
Morris v. Guetta: Are Appropriation Artists Getting a Free Pass by the Second Circuit?, COWAN,
DEBAETS, ABRAHAMS & SHEPPARD LLP LEGAL BLOG (May 28, 2013), http://cdas.com/morris-vguetta-are-appropriation-artists-getting-a-free-pass-by-the-second-circuit-2/ (“The Second Circuit’s
new, looser standard for determining whether a work is transformative is a shift from its usual
conservatism and serves as an invitation for infringement.”); Hart, supra note 5 (“What was once a
bounded exception allowing reasonable use of copyrighted works when necessary for specific
purposes has become a broad and sweeping mechanism that allows courts to seemingly ignore
copyright at their own discretion.”); Nimmer, supra note 13 (“Cases where courts protect copying
verbatim of all of copyrighted works as fair use because the copies are then used for different
purposes than the copyright owner has previously used its work . . . . stretch the boundaries of fair
use and ‘transformative’ ‘use’ beyond any reasonable breaking point.”); Barry Sookman, The
Google Book Project: Is It Fair Use?, BARRYSOOKMAN.COM (Jan. 5, 2014),
http://www.barrysookman.com/2014/01/05/the-google-book-project-is-it-fair-use/.
17. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
18. See, e.g., Henslee, supra note 4, at 680–81; Christopher Alan Hower, Reviving Fair Use: Why
Sony’s Expansion of Fair Use Sparked the File-Sharing Craze, 7 CHI.-KENT. J. INTELL. PROP. L.
75, 81–86 (2007); David R. Johnstone, Debunking Fair Use Rights and Copyduty Under U.S.
Copyright Law, 52 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 345, 382–83 (2005).
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In the 1976 Copyright Act, Congress replaced a scheme of bounded,
defined copyright rights specified for each copyright subject-matter
category with a broad statement of generally applicable copyright
exclusive rights offset by a list of detailed exceptions.19 It also codified
the doctrine of fair use. The Sony case, filed within weeks of the 1976
Act’s enactment, was the first case to pose the question whether fair use
was an appropriate shelter for conduct that Congress had failed to
consider.20 Answering that question in favor of either party would
require some revision in traditional understandings of fair use.
In Sony, the Court reshaped fair use in order to limit contributory
liability and shelter personal uses.21 That fair use formulation didn’t
work out so well for traditional beneficiaries of the fair use privilege,
most of whom made uses that were both public and commercial.22 In
Campbell, the Court revised fair use again for the benefit of traditional
fair users.23 That might have left personal users out in the rain. But in the
ten years that the Sony test had held sway, readers, consumers, and
businesses that made products to augment consumers’ enjoyment of
copyright works had adjusted their expectations and habits to a world in
which fair use shielded personal uses from copyright liability. If
copyright owners hoped that Campbell’s recalibration of the fair use
analysis would simply remove noncommercial and personal copies from
fair use’s shelter, they were disappointed. But that hope was never
politically reasonable.
The Campbell decision, and its application by lower courts, makes
more sense when one appreciates its predecessor, Sony v. Universal. The
Sony decision, in turn, makes more sense when one recognizes the
challenges posed by problems that Congress failed to address when it
enacted the 1976 Act.
I.

A SURPRISING LAWSUIT
The 1909 Copyright Act adopted the strategy of furnishing detailed

19. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-533, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C.
§§ 101–1205 (2012)).
20. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 432 (C.D. Cal. 1979),
rev’d, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rev’d, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
21. Sony, 464 U.S. at 449–55; see, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, The Generativity of Sony v.
Universal: The Intellectual Property Legacy of Justice Stevens, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1831, 1845–
50, 1862–65 (2006).
22. See Pierre N. Leval, Nimmer Lecture: Fair Use Rescued, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1449, 1455–56,
1463–64 (1997).
23. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
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specifications of the copyright rights available to owners of each type of
work.24 At the turn of the twentieth century, the specification of rights
may well have seemed comprehensive, but as the century wore on, it
turned out to be seriously incomplete.25 The 1976 Act, therefore, took
the opposite strategy of articulating the rights in very broad terms, and
then loading up the statute with exceptions, limitations, and privileges
for the uses that Congress deemed to be non-infringing.26 Congress paid
heed, though, only to uses and users brought to its attention by entities
involved in hammering out copyright revision, and did not address a
host of uses and users not presented to it.27
Once the 1976 Act took effect, users and uses that Congress had not
considered inevitably arose in lawsuits. Courts were left with the
unappealing choice of assimilating those uses to activities that Congress
had considered;28 finding implicit privileges, exceptions, and limitations
in the statute;29 or redesigning a statutory exception, limitation, or
privilege to fit the new situation.30 The Sony litigation posed two large
problems to which Congress had given little thought: the liability of
consumers for making copies for personal use, and the liability of device
manufacturers for facilitating infringing consumer uses.
Sony was not the first case seeking to hold the manufacturer of a
device liable because the device facilitated infringements,31 but it was
24. See Act of March 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 1, 35 Stat. 1075, 1075. This specification
looks a little crazy to modern eyes. Literary works, for example, received an exclusive translation
right but dramatic works did not; dramatic works, but not literary works, got an exclusive right to
record the works and exhibit or perform the recordings. Musical works’ public performance right
was limited to public performance for profit; dramatic works’ public performance right had no forprofit limitation. As originally enacted, the 1909 Act gave novels and other literary works no public
performance right whatsoever. Id.
25. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Silent Similarity, 14 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. L. 11 (2015).
26. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106–122 (2012); see generally JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 54–
59 (2006).
27. I told this story at some length in Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological
Change, 68 OR. L. REV. 275 (1989).
28. See, e.g., Am. Broad. Co. v. Aereo, Inc., __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2505–08 (2014).
29. See, e.g., Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., 180 F.3d 1072 (9th
Cir. 1999); Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc., 866 F.2d 278 (9th
Cir. 1989); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D.
Cal. 1995).
30. See, e.g., In re Cellco P’ship, 663 F. Supp. 2d 363, 375–77 (2009) (holding the public
performance of ringtones to be privileged by 17 U.S.C. § 110(4) (2005)).
31. In Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911), the publisher of a novel sued a film studio
for producing an unauthorized film adaptation of the novel. Id. at 60. Under the copyright law in
effect at the time, a film version was not a “copy” of the novel on which it was based. The Supreme
Court held that when the movie theatres that bought the film projected its images on a screen, those
projections dramatized the novel. Id. at 61–62. By making and advertising the film, the studio was
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the first suit seeking to hold a manufacturer of a device liable for
facilitating allegedly infringing behavior by millions of consumers in
their homes.32 The case raised problems that Congress had not
considered during the twenty-year process that led to the revision.
Members of Congress appear to have assumed that individuals were not
liable for making personal copies of copyrighted works, and they simply
hadn’t imagined a suit against a device maker seeking to recover for the
actions of millions of individuals in their homes.33 Indeed, although
Congress paid significant attention to newfangled copying technologies,
and had asked a blue ribbon commission to consider the issues posed by
new methods of reproduction, nobody appears to have suggested to
congressional committees or to the members of the Commission on New
Technological Uses (CONTU) that the manufacturers of copying devices
might be liable for infringing uses of their machines.
II.

WHAT WE LEARN FROM THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

The disruptive technologies of the 1960s were photocopying and
audiotape recording. Computers were on the horizon, but the threats they
posed were still hypothetical. When educators asked for exemptions for
educational photocopying and computer use, copyright owners urged
Congress to leave those exemptions out of the statute and instead refer
the question whether they were necessary to a blue ribbon commission.34
During the hearings on successive drafts of the legislation that became
the 1976 Act, witnesses and members of Congress discussed
photocopying and tape recording extensively.35 Everyone acknowledged
liable not as a direct infringer, but as a contributory infringer. Id. at 62–63. Early suits against radio
broadcasters over the broadcast of unlicensed public performances for the purpose of promoting the
sales of radios cast the manufacturer-broadcaster as a contributory rather than a direct infringer. See,
e.g., Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 16 F.2d 829, 829 (S.D.N.Y. 1926).
32. See Leval, supra note 22, at 1457.
33. See infra notes 34–60 and accompanying text.
34. E.g., Copyright Law Revision: Hearing on H.R. 4347, H.R. 5680, H.R. 6831, and H.R. 6835
Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 1452-60 (1965) [hereinafter
1965 House Hearings] (testimony of Bella Linden, American Textbook Publishers Institute).
Congress did refer the photocopying problem to a commission, which it named the Commission on
New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU). NAT’L COMM’N ON NEW
TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT 1 (1978). CONTU labored
mightily and came back with a report strongly implying that individual photocopying was fair use
but photocopying by commercial photocopy services might not be. Id. at 48–50.
35. See generally Prohibiting Piracy of Sound Recordings: Hearing on S. 646 and H.R. 6927
Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong. (1971) [hereinafter
Prohibiting Piracy of Sound Recordings Hearing]; Copyright Law Revision: Hearing on S. 597
Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks & Copyrights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th
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that consumers were already using photocopiers and tape recorders to
make copies of copyrighted works for their own use, and that there was
not and should not be a fear of consumer liability for making those
copies.36 Most but not all of the witnesses said that an individual’s use of
a photocopy machine in a library or workplace qualified as fair use.37
There were outliers. One witness—Ralph Dwan, of the 3M Corporation
(a major manufacturer of both audiotape and photocopy machines)—
asked Congress to enact a provision explicitly privileging the making of
any personal or private copies so long as they were not offered for sale.38
In response to Dwan’s proposal, a single witness—Irwin Karp for the
Author’s League—insisted that even individual photocopying should be
considered to be infringement:
If an individual or an institution borrowed a copy of a book
from a library and ran off 100 copies on a Xerox machine, or
any other method, 100 copies at one time, and sold them or gave
them to me and to 99 other people, he would be guilty of
infringement. If he ran off the hundred copies one at a time, as
each of us ordered them, and gave them or sold them to us, it
would still be an infringement. In either event a hundred copies
would have been made and placed in the hands of a hundred
people without the author’s consent, and without any payment to
the author or publisher.
Now suppose that I and the 99 other persons each borrowed
the same copy of the book from the same library and each of us
made a copy for himself on a Xerox machine. The result is the
same. One hundred copes [sic] have been made and placed in
the hands of a hundred people without the author’s consent, and
without any payment to the author or publisher.
Now I had not intended to belabor the Xerox machine; we
don’t object to copying technology, we welcome it. It so
Cong. (1967) [hereinafter 1967 Senate Hearings]; 1965 House Hearings, supra note 34; Diane
Leenheer Zimmerman, Modern Technology, Leaky Copyrights, and Claims of Harm: Insights from
the Curious History of Photocopying, 61 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y OF THE U.S.A. 1, 19–27 (2013).
36. See, e.g., Prohibiting Piracy of Sound Recordings Hearing, supra note 35, at 22–23
(colloquy).
37. See, e.g., Copyright Law Revision: Hearing on S. 1006 Before the Subcomm. on Patents,
Trademarks and Copyrights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 180 (1965) (testimony of
Mark Carroll, Chairman, Copyright Committee, Association of American University Presses); id. at
187–88 (colloquy); 1965 House Hearings, supra note 34, at 119–21 (statement of Dan Lacy,
Managing Director, American Book Publishers Council); id. at 367–71 (colloquy); id. at 1517–18
(colloquy).
38. 1965 House Hearings, supra note 34, at 1498–99 (statement of Ralph H. Dwan, Minnesota
Mining & Manufacturing Co. (3M)).
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happens that when someone makes a superior product they must
suffer the penalty of being cited an example, and I am only
using them as an example.39
For the most part, though, lawyers representing copyright owners
testified that their concern over photocopying technology was that it
would be used for mass duplication, displacing the traditional publishing
industry.40 Though consumers also made copies, copyright owners didn’t
view that as a major concern.41 None of the lobbyists participating in
copyright revision suggested that the makers of photocopying machines
might be liable for unauthorized copying by their customers.42 Members
of Congress didn’t seriously consider whether the new law should
impose liability on consumers or manufacturers for photocopying
because nobody asked them to do so.
Similar evidence supports the inference that members of Congress
believed that neither the 1909 Copyright Act nor the 1976 Act made it
illegal for consumers to use a tape recorder to record music from records
or radio broadcasts. The 1909 Act had protected “musical works” (i.e.,
the musical composition authored by a composer) but had not extended
copyright protection to “sound recordings” (i.e., the recording of a
performance of a composition, authored by performers and a record
producer or sound engineer).43 Record labels first sought federal
copyright protection for their recordings in response to radio
broadcasters’ and jukebox operators’ commercial use of their records.44
39. Id. at 1756 (statement of Irwin Karp, Authors’ League of America, Inc.).
40. See, e.g., id. at 1431 (testimony of Bella Linden, American Textbook Publishers Institute); id.
at 1514 (prepared statement of Williams & Wilkins Co.).
41. See, e.g., 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 35, at 64–96 (testimony of Prof. Jesse W.
Markham, Horace S. Manges, Lee C. Deighton, and Bella L. Linden for the American Textbook
Publishers Institute and the American Book Publishers Council, Inc.); 1965 House Hearings, supra
note 34, at 121 (testimony of Dan Lacy, Managing Director, American Book Publishers Council);
id. at 1451–60 (testimony of Bella Linden, American Textbook Publishers Institute); id. at 1505–07
(colloquy); id. at 1517–18 (colloquy); see also id. at 1650 (statement of Gerhard Van Arkel, General
Counsel, International Typographical Union) (“There is all the difference in the world between a
library photocopying an occasional page of a work for the use of a scholar, and the making of
multiple copies of entire works by any of the photographic processes which may now substitute for
printing, presswork and binding.”).
42. One witness did suggest that the owner of a copying machine should be liable for its
infringing use, but thought that manufacturers’ responsibility should be limited to an obligation to
affix labels on their machines warning that the use of the machines was subject to federal currency
and copyright laws. 1965 House Hearings, supra note 34, at 1516 (testimony of Lyle Lodwick,
Williams & Wilkins Co.).
43. See generally BARBARA A. RINGER, STUDY NO. 26: THE UNAUTHORIZED DUPLICATION OF
SOUND RECORDINGS (1957).
44. See, e.g., Milton Diamond & Jerome H. Adler, Proposed Copyright Revision and
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Efforts to expand copyright to cover sound recordings in the 1920s,
1930s, and 1940s foundered.45 In the 1950s, increasing concern over
commercial record piracy made the problem more urgent.46
As early as 1961, the Copyright Office recommended that the revision
bill that became the 1976 Copyright Act confer copyright protection on
sound recordings,47 and it included copyright for sound recordings in the
earliest draft revision bill.48 In 1963, the Phillips Corporation introduced
the 3.8 mm audio cassette tape and portable cassette tape player to the
U.S. market. As a result, commercial record piracy became cheaper and
easier.49 Meanwhile, the sale of inexpensive consumer cassette tape
recorders allowed home taping of records and radio to explode.50 By
1965, the House and Senate committees had settled on language giving
sound recordings limited copyright protection,51 but the copyright
Phonograph Records, 11 AIR L. REV. 29, 45, 55–56 (1940).
45. A 1957 Copyright Office Study described previously unsuccessful efforts to extend copyright
to sound recordings going back as early as 1925. RINGER, supra note 43, at 21–37. The principal
obstacles, as then-Assistant Register Barbara Ringer tells the story, were disputes between
performers and record labels about which of them the law should deem the author and copyright
owner, resistance by composers and music publishers, and objections from broadcasters, who feared
that copyright in recordings would oblige them to pay record royalties as well as music royalties. Id.
46. See, e.g., Sidney A. Diamond, Copyright Problems of the Phonograph Record Industry, 8
BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y OF THE U.S.A. 337, 353 (1961); RINGER, supra note 43, at 47.
47. REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., REP. ON THE
GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 17–18 (Comm. Print 1961).
48. COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION PART 3: PRELIMINARY DRAFT FOR REVISED U.S. COPYRIGHT
LAW AND COMMENTS AND DISCUSSION ON THE DRAFT 1 (Comm. Print 1964) [hereinafter CLR Part
3]. The copyright for sound recordings was expressly limited by section 10 of the draft bill to a right
to reproduce directly and distribute dubbed copies of the sound recording, excluding an imitation
right and a public performance right. See id. at 7–8. This limitation survived in the version enacted
in 1976. One of the political problems that doomed earlier efforts was a dispute over whether the
author of a sound recording was the musician responsible for the performance or the record label
that released it. The 1964 draft sought to evade that problem by failing to specify the answer. That
disagreement remained a dozen years later, and the act accordingly incorporated the ambiguity. The
dispute over authorship of sound recordings continues to plague the law today. See, e.g.,
Bucciarelli-Tieger v. Victory Records, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 2d 702 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
49. See Prohibiting Piracy of Sound Recordings Hearing, supra note 35, at 4 (statement of Rep.
Celler); id. at 10–12 (testimony of Barbara A. Ringer, Assistant Register of Copyrights).
50. See id. at 120 (letter from David Abshire, Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations,
U.S. Department of State); ADRIAN JOHNS, PIRACY: THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WARS FROM
GUTENBERG TO GATES 444–48 (2009).
51. Sections 106 and 112 of H.R. 4347, 89 Cong. (as introduced by Rep. Emanuel Celler on Feb.
4, 1965), like the 1964 draft bill, described supra note 48, would have given the owners of the
copyright in sound recordings the exclusive right to duplicate or dub the actual sounds on the
recording, and to distribute dubbed copies but no public performance right. Performers and
musicians objected vehemently to the bill because it failed to give their interests sufficient
protection. See 1965 House Hearings, supra note 34, at 1387–405 (1966) (the Performing
Musicians’ Opposition to the 1965 Bill for General Copyright Revision).
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revision bill had stalled in the Senate because the operators of
Community Antenna Television (an early form of cable television)
couldn’t reach agreement with motion picture producers and
broadcasters.52 Record labels insisted that the piracy problem demanded
immediate action.53 The Senate subcommittee made the decision to split
off the sound recording copyright provisions into a discrete bill and
enact it separately.54 Drafters took the substantive provisions of the
copyright revision bill and retrofitted the language to match the language
of the 1909 Act.55
At the House hearings on the new, stand-alone sound recording
copyright bill, House Judiciary Committee Chairman Emanuel Celler
explained that the bill was designed to target record “piracy,” which he
described as “the unauthorized commercial duplication and sale of a
reproduction of a sound recording, often at a sharply cut price.”56
Representative Edward Biester, Republican of Pennsylvania, asked
whether his son’s use of a cassette recorder to record music off the radio
would be prohibited by the bill. Assistant Register of Copyrights
Barbara Ringer assured him that it would not.57
The House Report on the bill repeated that understanding:
In approving the creation of a limited copyright in sound
recordings it is the intention of the Committee that this limited
copyright not grant any broader rights than are accorded to other
copyright proprietors under the existing title 17. Specifically, it
is not the intention of the Committee to restrain the home
recording, from broadcasts or from tapes or records, of recorded
performances, where the home recording is for private use and
with no purpose of reproducing or otherwise capitalizing
commercially on it. This practice is common and unrestrained
today, and the record producers and performers would be in no
different position from that of the owners of copyright in

52. See Copyright Law Revision—CATV: Hearing on S. 1006 Before the Subcomm. on Patents,
Trademarks, & Copyrights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. (1966); Jessica Litman,
Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 874–75 (1987).
53. See Prohibiting Piracy of Sound Recordings Hearings, supra note 35, at 38–41 (statement of
Stanley M. Gortikov, Director, Recording Industry Association of America); id. at 41–42 (statement
of Jack Grossman, President, National Association of Record Merchandisers, Inc.).
54. See S. REP. NO. 92-72, at 3–6 (1971).
55. Prohibiting Piracy of Sound Recordings Hearing, supra note 35, at 13 (testimony of Barbara
A. Ringer, Assistant Register of Copyrights).
56. Id. at 4 (statement of Rep. Celler).
57. Id. at 22–23 (colloquy).
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recorded musical compositions over the past 20 years.58
That formulation indicates that members of the House committee
recognized that neither the owners of musical composition copyrights
nor the owners of the new sound recording copyrights had rights under
the statute that extended to noncommercial home copying. Chairman
Kastenmeier made the point again on the floor of the House of
Representatives just before the House voted in favor of the Bill.
Mr. KAZEN. Am I correct in assuming that the bill protects
copyrighted material that is duplicated for commercial purposes
only?
Mr. KASTENMEIER. Yes.
Mr. KAZEN. In other words, if your child were to record off
of a program which comes through the air on the radio or
television, and then used it for her own personal pleasure, for
listening pleasure, this use would not be included under the
penalties of this bill?
Mr. KASTENMEIER. This is not included in the bill. I am
glad the gentleman raises the point.
On page 7 of the report, under “Home Recordings,” Members
will note that under the bill the same practice which prevails
today is called for; namely, this is considered both presently and
under the proposed law to be fair use. The child does not do this
for commercial purposes. This is made clear in the report.59
Thus, as of 1971, when the language, structure, and scope of the bill
that became the 1976 Copyright Act had been settled except for details,
members of Congress appear to have believed that that language didn’t
and wouldn’t reach noncommercial consumer copying. As with
photocopiers, there was no suggestion that the manufacturers of audio
recorders or blank audio media might bear legal responsibility for
unlicensed copies.
Let me stop to emphasize the limits of my point. I am not arguing
here that the language of the 1976 Copyright Act should be read to
incorporate an unstated exclusion for consumer liability. I am making
only the modest observation that the evidence we have indicates that,
when Congress enacted the 1976 Act, senators and representatives
believed that neither consumer photocopying nor consumer taping of
music would count as copyright infringement under the language of the
Act. Reasonable people may have heated arguments over the extent to
58. H.R. REP. NO. 92-487, at 7 (1971).
59. 117 CONG. REC. 34, 748–49 (1971).
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which Congress’s understanding of what it was doing ought to constrain
courts’ interpretation of the language Congress enacted. For my
purposes, it’s sufficient to show that Congress didn’t anticipate that the
1976 Act would subject consumers to liability for copyright
infringement, so it didn’t give any attention to the circumstances under
which consumers should receive express exemptions or privileges.
Because Congress appears to have assumed that individuals would
not be liable for copyright infringement for unauthorized consumer
copying, it didn’t take the opportunity at any time during the twenty-year
revision process to consider what exceptions, limitations, and privileges
would be appropriate for unlicensed personal uses.60 Because of that
assumption, moreover, it never considered the possibility that
widespread unlicensed personal uses would be deemed infringing in the
aggregate, or that the makers of devices or services would be accused of
infringement for making those uses possible. It had no opportunity to
design exemptions or limitations for those cases, if it thought it
appropriate to do so, nor to fashion an appropriate range of remedies for
contributory infringement liability predicated on the sale of
infringement-enabling devices and services to the general public.
III.

SONY AND ITS AFTERMATH

On November 11, 1976, three weeks after Congress enacted the 1976
Copyright Act, Universal Studios filed a copyright infringement suit
against William Griffiths. Universal didn’t expect to recover any money
from Griffiths. In fact, he was a client of Universal’s law firm who
happened to own a Sony Betamax videotape recorder. The firm secured
his permission to be sued before naming him in its lawsuit against
Sony.61 Universal felt that Sony’s manufacture and sale of a videotape
recorder infringed its copyrights in the programs that consumers taped.62
Because Sony itself did not reproduce, adapt, distribute, perform, or
60. A handful of privileges that courts have applied to personal uses were in fact drafted for the
benefit of institutions. The § 110(4) privilege that the court in In re Cellco P’ship, 663 F. Supp. 2d
363, 375–77 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), construed to permit owners of cellphones to publicly perform music
when their cellphones rang in public places, for example, was designed to permit school assemblies.
See COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION PART 6, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF
COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 39 (Comm. Print 1965).
61. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 437 (C.D. Cal. 1979),
rev’d, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rev’d, 464 U.S. 417 (1984); see JAMES LARDNER, FAST
FORWARD: A MACHINE AND THE COMMOTION IT CAUSED 17 (2002). Lardner’s book, adapted and
expanded from a series of articles in The New Yorker magazine, is an authoritative and highly
readable account of the facts underlying the Sony Betamax lawsuit.
62. See LARDNER, supra note 61, at 5–9, 13.
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display any of Universal’s movies, Sony was not itself doing anything
the copyright statute prohibited. Universal’s legal theory, though, was
that Sony was deliberately enabling consumers to make unlawful copies
of television programs, and should therefore be held liable as a
contributory infringer.63 In order to hold Sony liable for consumers’
copyright infringement, Universal’s lawyers believed they should make
one of those consumers a defendant in the suit.64
Many copyright owners understandably believe that they should be
able to control who profits from works in which they own the
copyrights.65 Sony was making a significant amount of money selling
devices designed to copy copyrighted television programs, and the fact
that Sony wasn’t itself doing any of the copying didn’t seem to
Universal as if it should be determinative. And while suits against
consumers before this lawsuit were almost unheard of, copyright owner
efforts to stop other businesses from profiting from copyrighted works
were not.
I like to call this problem the trumpet problem.66 Trumpets, here, are a
synecdoche for the businesses that make instruments, devices, and
services designed for the enjoyment of copyrighted works. This category
comprises trumpets, pianos, violins, radios, cameras, televisions, tape
recorders, film projectors, computers, DVD players, ebook readers,
smart phones, tablets, iPods, music cyberlockers, cloud storage, and
user-generated video platforms. The people who make trumpets are in
the business of making money because of works written by others.
Indeed, their business models often depend on the indirect commercial
exploitation of other people’s creativity. In general, trumpet makers
profit commercially by taking advantage of readers’, listeners’, and
players’ willingness to spend money to enhance their enjoyment of
works (or advertisers’ willingness to spend money to reach individuals
who enjoy copyrighted works). Because the copyright statute defines the
scope of copyright owners’ rights with reference to reproducing,
adapting, and publicly distributing, performing, and displaying,
unlicensed profiting from copyrighted works, without more, is not
infringement.
In suing Sony for making and selling Betamax recorders, then,
Universal was claiming that consumers who used the Betamax to record
63. See Sony, 480 F. Supp. at 441–42.
64. See LARDNER, supra note 61, at 17–18.
65. See, e.g., David Carr, Spreading Disruption, Shaking up Cable TV, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18,
2013, at B1, B5.
66. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Real Copyright Reform, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1, 21 (2010).
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and then watch television programs were making infringing copies of the
programs, and that Sony should be liable as a contributory infringer for
giving consumers the tool necessary to commit the infringement.67 The
aspect of the suit that attracted the most public attention was the claim
that William Griffiths might be liable for using a recording device in his
home to allow him to watch television programs.68 The claim that
proved more troubling to the judges who had to decide the case was the
idea that an appropriate response to unlicensed copying was to impose
infringement liability on the makers and sellers of copying machines.69
Neither Congress nor the CONTU Commission had even broached that
as a possibility. What made the claim at least colorable was Congress’s
casting exclusive copyright rights in very broad terms and then
subjecting the rights to specific exceptions. Sony’s sale of video
recorders was simply a particularly surprising example of a situation in
which Congress had failed to imagine copyright infringement liability
and therefore failed to include express limitations or define boundaries
to divide infringing from non-infringing actions. The general problem
would keep coming up.
The trial judge reviewed the copyright statute’s legislative history and
concluded that neither the 1909 Copyright Act nor the 1976 Act gave
copyright owners control over an individual’s home copying of
television broadcasts for personal use.70 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
reversed. The panel read the language of the statute to prohibit any and
all reproductions that were not explicitly exempted.71 Home videotaping
went unmentioned by both the 1909 and 1976 Copyright Acts, so
making personal videotapes necessarily infringed the studios’ copyright.
Since the primary purpose of a Betamax machine was to allow
consumers to make these infringing copies, Sony, its advertising agency,
and the stores that sold Betamax recorders should all be liable for
contributory infringement.72
Sony appealed, and the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case. After

67. See Sony, 480 F. Supp. at 441–42.
68. See, e.g., Robert Lindsey, Monumental Legal Battle Shaping Up in Bid to Bar Color TV
Recorders, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1977, at D1, D8; Philip Shenon, Copyright v. ‘Reprography’
Revolution, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1981, at E7.
69. See Leval, supra note 22, at 1457; Jessica Litman, The Sony Paradox, 55 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 917, 945–46 (2005).
70. Sony, 480 F. Supp. at 442–47.
71. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 966 (9th Cir. 1981), rev’d,
464 U.S. 417 (1984).
72. Id. at 971–76.
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oral argument, the majority of Justices were disposed to affirm the Ninth
Circuit decision, at least in part.73 Justice Blackmun took on the
assignment of drafting the opinion for the Court. His analysis began with
the premise that the 1976 Act granted copyright owners a broad
reproduction right. According to Congress’ plan, any unlicensed
reproduction was infringing unless it came within a statutory exception.
The statute did not include an express exemption for home video
recording.74 Justice Blackmun concluded that Congress had proved it
was able to draft explicit exemptions for the private uses when it
included a privilege for libraries to make a single copy for a patron’s
private study scholarship or research, and when it limited the
performance right to public performances.75 Fair use should not apply; it
was a narrow privilege intended to permit “productive uses[s], resulting
in some added benefit to the public beyond that produced by the first
author’s work.”76
Justice Stevens disagreed. He insisted that the legislative history of
the 1976 Copyright Act evidenced a widely shared understanding that it
was not copyright infringement for individuals to make personal copies
for their own use.77 A further difficulty with reading the statute to permit
the imposition of contributory liability for the aggregate copying of
millions of consumers was the fact that the remedy sections of the statute
didn’t seem to contemplate it; indeed, they permitted copyright owners
to seek statutory damages, even for innocent infringement, of a
minimum of $200 for each and every work infringed. Those provisions
73. This account of the Supreme Court’s deliberations in the Sony case is drawn from the papers
of Justices Blackmun, Marshall, and Brennan, and has been told in more detail in Jonathan Band &
Andrew J. McLaughlin, The Marshall Papers: A Peek Behind the Scenes at the Making of Sony v.
Universal, 17 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 427 (1994), and Litman, supra note 69. Justice Blackmun
had reluctantly recused himself from an earlier copyright fair use case, Williams & Wilkins Co. v.
United States, 420 U.S. 376 (1975), because of his nine years as resident counsel to the Mayo clinic.
The Mayo Foundation was a defendant in the case. Blackmun’s personal notes indicate that, had he
participated, Blackmun would have provided the fifth vote to reverse the Court of Claims, and hold
the National Library of Medicine liable for photocopying articles from medical journals.
74. First Draft Opinion of Justice Harry A. Blackmun at 8–9, Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal
City Studios, Inc., No. 81-1687 (circulated June 13, 1983).
75. Id. at 12–13. Furthermore, Blackmun wrote, Congress had proved it was able to draft
exemptions for the reproduction of single copies when it included privileges for libraries and
broadcasters to make no more than one copy in the statute. Id. at 9. Justice Blackmun also noted that
the House and Senate Reports mentioned a handful of instances in which the making of a single
copy would be fair use. Id.
76. Id. at 22.
77. Memorandum from Justice John Paul Stevens to the Conference (June 13, 1983); Letter from
Justice John Paul Stevens to Justice Harry A. Blackmun (Jan. 24, 1983); see also Band &
McLaughlin, supra note 73, at 433–34.
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would subject both consumers and the manufacturers of copying
equipment to “truly staggering liability.”78
Justice Stevens circulated letters to the other Justices arguing the
merits of his position. He sent around successive drafts of an alternative
opinion.79 Justice Stevens would have recognized a categorical
exemption for consumer home copying, but could not persuade a
majority of his colleagues to agree. Instead, he articulated a standard for
ascertaining whether William Griffiths’ copying (and the copying of
four million Betamax owners like him) was a sufficient predicate for
Sony’s liability. Stevens’ efforts peeled off Justices from Justice
Blackmun’s majority until he had collected the five votes he needed.80
Stevens’ opinion for the majority concluded that consumers’ copying of
broadcast television was in many cases not copyright infringement
because it was fair use.
[Section 107] identifies various factors that enable a court to
apply an “equitable rule of reason” analysis to particular claims
of infringement. Although not conclusive, the first factor
requires that “the commercial or nonprofit character of an
activity” be weighed in any fair use decision. If the Betamax
were used to make copies for a commercial or profitmaking
purpose, such use would presumptively be unfair. The contrary
presumption is appropriate here, however, because the District
Court’s findings plainly establish that time-shifting for private
home use must be characterized as a noncommercial, nonprofit
activity. Moreover, when one considers the nature of a televised
copyrighted audiovisual work, see 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (1982
ed.), and that time-shifting merely enables a viewer to see such a
work which he had been invited to witness in its entirety free of
charge, the fact that the entire work is reproduced, see § 107(3),
does not have its ordinary effect of militating against a finding
of fair use.
This is not, however, the end of the inquiry because Congress
has also directed us to consider “the effect of the use upon the
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.” § 107(4).
The purpose of copyright is to create incentives for creative
78. Letter from Justice John Paul Stevens to Justice Harry A. Blackmun (Jan. 24, 1983).
79. First Draft Memorandum of Justice John Paul Stevens, Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc. (No. 81-1687) (circulated June 13, 1983); Second Draft Memorandum of Justice
Stevens, Sony Corp. Of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. (No. 81-1687) (circulated June 27,
1983); Third Draft Memorandum of Justice Stevens, Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios,
Inc. (No. 81-1687) (circulated June 28, 1983).
80. See Litman, supra note 69, at 932–41.
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effort. Even copying for noncommercial purposes may impair
the copyright holder’s ability to obtain the rewards that
Congress intended him to have. But a use that has no
demonstrable effect upon the potential market for, or the value
of, the copyrighted work need not be prohibited in order to
protect the author’s incentive to create. The prohibition of such
noncommercial uses would merely inhibit access to ideas
without any countervailing benefit.
Thus, although every commercial use of copyrighted material
is presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly
privilege that belongs to the owner of the copyright,
noncommercial uses are a different matter. A challenge to a
noncommercial use of a copyrighted work requires proof either
that the particular use is harmful, or that if it should become
widespread, it would adversely affect the potential market for
the copyrighted work. Actual present harm need not be shown;
such a requirement would leave the copyright holder with no
defense against predictable damage. Nor is it necessary to show
with certainty that future harm will result. What is necessary is a
showing by a preponderance of the evidence that some
meaningful likelihood of future harm exists. If the intended use
is for commercial gain, that likelihood may be presumed. But if
it is for a noncommercial purpose, the likelihood must be
demonstrated.
In this case, respondents failed to carry their burden with
regard to home time-shifting.81
While Justice Stevens failed to persuade the majority of his
colleagues that personal uses should be categorically exempt from
copyright infringement liability, he did persuade them to adopt a
standard under which personal uses were deemed noncommercial and
presumptively fair. The standard would prove unworkable not because
of that presumption, but because of the corollary that all commercial
uses were presumptively unfair.82
A year after releasing the Sony decision, in a case involving excerpts
from former President Gerald Ford’s autobiography, the Court returned
to the twin presumptions. The Nation had summarized and quoted 300
81. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448–51 (1984). Justice
Blackmun revised his draft majority opinion and released it as a dissent. He argued that fair use
should be limited to productive reuses that merited a subsidy, and consumer copying for personal
use was an ordinary rather than a productive use. But he had, at least temporarily, lost that argument
with his colleagues.
82. Leval, supra note 22, at 1455–56.
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words from Ford’s forthcoming memoir, and the publisher had sued it
for copyright infringement. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
thought the use should be deemed fair under § 107,83 but the Supreme
Court relied on the Sony presumptions to reverse.84 Although The Nation
magazine was marginal,85 it was formally a business, seeking to earn a
profit. Its use of 300 words from the Ford memoir was therefore
commercial, and thus presumptively unfair. “The fact that a publication
was commercial as opposed to nonprofit is a separate factor that tends to
weigh against a finding of fair use,” Justice O’Connor wrote, quoting
Sony. “[Every] commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively
an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the
owner of the copyright.”86
The Harper & Row case highlighted a defect in Sony’s formulation of
fair use. In Sony, the Court confronted a case predicated on consumers’
personal copying. The Supreme Court found that copying to be fair use
by recognizing a presumption that noncommercial uses came within the
shelter of § 107. But, that, in turn, suggested a related presumption that
commercial uses were to be presumed unfair. As one would expect, the
latter presumption worked very badly for traditional beneficiaries of fair
use, many of whom used copyrighted works in connection with
commercial activity. Biographers,87 parodists,88 and news organizations89
suddenly found fair use unavailable. Meanwhile, though, the public had
come to understand that noncommercial and personal uses were not
infringing. Members of Congress appear to have shared that
interpretation.
While the Sony litigation was working its way through the courts,
motion picture studios, device makers, and consumer and library groups

83. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 208 (2d Cir. 1983), rev’d,
471 U.S. 539 (1985).
84. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560–63 (1985).
85. According to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, The Nation’s receipts from
newsstand sales of the issue were $418. Harper & Row, 725 F.2d at 198.
86. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562; see also Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 237 (1990) (Since
“[p]etitioners received $12 million from the re-release of the motion picture during the renewal
term,” their use was commercial.).
87. See, e.g., New Era Publ’ns Int’l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576, 583–84 (2d Cir. 1989).
88. See, e.g., Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992); Tin Pan Apple, Inc. v. Miller
Brewing Co., 737 F. Supp. 826 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Original Appalachian Artworks v. Topps Chewing
Gum, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 1031 (N.D. Ga. 1986).
89. See Hi-Tech Video Prods., Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 950 (W.D. Mich.
1992).

08 - Litman_post final author review 06.04.15.doc (Do Not Delete)

670

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

6/4/15 11:45 AM

[Vol. 90:651

sought clarifying copyright amendments from Congress.90 Between the
1981 Ninth Circuit decision finding Sony liable, and the 1984 Supreme
Court decision holding that home recording of broadcast television
programming was fair use, Congress held seven hearings on the issue
and considered nine different bills.91 Both motion picture industrybacked bills92 and consumer- and device-maker-backed bills93 expressly
absolved consumers of any liability for home recording of video
programs. Movie industry bills, however, coupled the exemption with a
mechanism for collecting royalties from device and media
manufacturers.94 The industry assured Congress that it had no interest in
pursuing individual homeowners who taped television shows.95 Even the
Motion Picture Association of America lobbyist Jack Valenti, who
famously testified that “the VCR is to the American film producer and
the American public as the Boston strangler is to the woman home
alone,” conceded a few minutes later that he owned and used a video
tape recorder and wasn’t at all worried about being sued.96
The assumption that consumers would not be not liable for making
unlicensed copies for personal use persisted in Congress during the
decade following the Sony decision and was an important predicate for

90. See Video and Audio Home Taping: Hearing on S. 31 and S. 175 Before the Subcomm. on
Patents, Copyrights & Trademarks of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 1 (1983)
[hereinafter 1983 Home Taping Hearing]; Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearing on H.R.
4783, H.R. 4794, H.R. 4808, H.R. 5250, H.R. 5488, and H.R. 5705 Before the Subcomm. on Courts
of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. (1982) [hereinafter 1982 Home Recording Hearing].
91. See 1983 Home Taping Hearing, supra note 90; Copyright Office/Copyright Royalty
Tribunal: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, & the Administration of Justice
of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. (1983) [hereinafter 1983 Royalty Tribunal Hearing];
Oversight of the Copyright Office and the Copyright Royalty Tribunal: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights, & Trademarks of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong.
(1983) [hereinafter 1983 Oversight Hearing]; Copyright and Technological Change: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, & the Administration of Justice of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 98th Cong. (1983) [hereinafter 1983 Technological Change Hearing]; 1982 Home
Recording Hearing, supra note 90; Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders): Hearing
on S. 1758 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 549 (1982) [hereinafter 1982
Copyright Infringements Hearing].
92. See, e.g., S. 31, 98th Cong. (1983); H.R. 5705, 97th Cong. (1982).
93. See, e.g., S. 175, 98th Cong. (1983); S. 1758, 97th Cong. (1981); H.R. 4783, 97th Cong.
(1981).
94. See, e.g., S. 31, 98th Cong. (1983).
95. See, e.g., 1983 Home Taping Hearing, supra note 90, at 276–77 (testimony of Jack Valenti,
Motion Picture Association of America); 1982 Copyright Infringements Hearing, supra note 91, at
459 (testimony of Jack Valenti, Motion Picture Association of America).
96. See 1982 Home Recording Hearing, supra note 90, at 8, 10 (testimony of Jack Valenti,
Motion Picture Association of America).
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the 1992 Audio Home Recording Act.97 In the years following Sony, the
recording industry lobbied Congress in pursuit of a rule limiting the
importation and sale of digital audio recorders.98 Record labels argued
that the Sony standard didn’t, or at least shouldn’t, make home audio
recording lawful; the manufacturers of tape recorders insisted that their
devices were staple articles of commerce under Sony, immune from
liability so long as they were capable of substantial non-infringing
uses.99 Eventually, record labels, composers, music publishers,
musicians, and the makers of recording devices reached a compromise
calling for the implementation of copy-control technology in digital
recorders and the payment of a royalty on sales of recording machines
and blank recording media, to be divided among record labels,
performers, composers, and music publishers.100
Crucially, though, in return for those provisions, members of
Congress insisted on an explicit statement in the law that clarified
consumers’ rights to make noncommercial copies of recorded music
without fear of copyright liability.101 That concession was essential to
gaining congressional support for the amendment. Owners of music and
sound recording copyrights acceded to it because—at the time—it
seemed cheap.102 Under the Sony formulation of fair use, noncommercial
consumer copying was already presumptively fair.103
97. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-873 (1992); S. REP. NO. 102-294, at 30 (1991) (“The purpose of S.
1623 is to ensure the right of consumers to make analog or digital audio recordings of copyrighted
music for their private, noncommercial use.”).
98. See generally Copyright Issues Posed by Digital Audio Tape: Joint Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights, & Trademarks of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary and the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, & the Administration of Justice of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 100th Cong. (1987) [hereinafter 1987 Digital Audio Hearing]; Home Audio Recording
Act: Hearing on S. 1739 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. (1986) [hereinafter 1986
Home Audio Hearing].
99. See 1986 Home Audio Hearing, supra note 98, at 90–91 (testimony of Stanley Gortikoff,
Recording Industry Association of America); id. at 289–90, 298 (testimony of Charles Ferris, Audio
Recording Rights Coalition).
100. See Audio Home Recording Act of 1991: Hearing on H.R. 3204 Before the Subcomm. on
Intellectual Property & Judicial Admin. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 1–2 (1993)
[hereinafter 1991 Audio Recording Hearing] (remarks of Rep. Hughes); The Audio Home Recording
Act of 1991: Hearing on S. 1623 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights & Trademarks of the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 109–11 (1992) (testimony of Jason Berman, Recording
Industry Association of America).
101. H.R. REP. NO. 102-873, pt. 1, at 24 (1992); see William F. Patry, Section 1008, PATRY
COPYRIGHT BLOG (Aug. 17, 2005), http://williampatry.blogspot.com/2005/08/section-1008.html.
102. See generally 1991 Audio Recording Hearing, supra note 100.
103. See Jessica Litman, War Stories, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 337 (2002). The continuing
vitality of the consumer noncommercial copying exemption, and its application to files copied using
computers rather than dedicated audio recording devices, is disputed. See id. at 357–60. Compare
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FAIR USE AND CAMPBELL V. ACUFF-ROSE

While consumers and businesses after Sony organized their activities
and products around the assumption that noncommercial and personal
consumer uses were generally non-infringing, writers, publishers, and
performers faced an unanticipated risk of liability for customary uses.
The presumptive unavailability of fair use for commercial purposes
meant that uses long deemed to be fair use suddenly were fair no more.
Some courts devised evasions to allow them to give the commercial
nature of the use reduced weight,104 but other courts found the
commercial purpose of purported fair users determinative.105
In 1994, the Supreme Court repudiated the twin presumptions when it
decided Campbell.106 It did not, however, repudiate either the result or
the reasoning in Sony. Justice Souter’s opinion for the Court instead
maintained that Sony had been misconstrued by lower courts.
If, indeed, commerciality carried presumptive force against a
finding of fairness, the presumption would swallow nearly all of
the illustrative uses listed in the preamble paragraph of § 107,
including news reporting, comment, criticism, teaching,
scholarship, and research, since these activities “are generally
conducted for profit in this country.” Harper &
Row . . . (Brennan, J., dissenting). Congress could not have
intended such a rule, which certainly is not inferable from the
common-law cases, arising as they did from the world of letters
in which Samuel Johnson could pronounce that “[n]o man but a
blockhead ever wrote, except for money.” 3 Boswell’s Life of
Johnson 19 (G. Hill ed. 1934).107
The Sony opinion, he insisted, “called for no hard evidentiary

A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.2d 1004, 1024 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Audio Home Recording
Act does not cover the downloading of MP3 files to computer hard drives.”), with Recording Indus.
Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., 180 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Such copying is
paradigmatic noncommercial personal use entirely consistent with the purposes of the Act.”).
104. See, e.g., Sega Enters., Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992); Fisher v. Dees,
794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986); Haberman v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 201 (D. Mass.
1986).
105. See Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1436 (6th Cir. 1992), rev’d, 510
U.S. 569 (1994); Hi-Tech Video Prods. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 950, 955 (W.D.
Mich. 1992); Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1532 (S.D.N.Y.
1991); Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 1031 (N.D.
Ga. 1986).
106. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 583–85, 594.
107. Id. at 584.
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presumption.”108 A more important aspect of the first fair use factor,
Justice Souter wrote, was the extent to which the use was
“transformative.” That formulation was drawn from Judge Pierre Leval’s
1990 Harvard Law Review commentary Toward a Fair Use Standard.109
(Judge Leval later returned the favor, calling Justice Souter’s opinion in
Campbell “the finest opinion ever written on the subject of fair use.”110)
The Campbell analysis returned fair use part of the way back to the
traditional, mid-twentieth century understanding of how fair use should
work. But, of course, it couldn’t return it all the way. The problem posed
by the Sony case remained unsolved. What should courts do about uses
or infringement claims that Congress had paid no attention to, in
particular personal uses? Campbell didn’t speak to it; it carefully
preserved the result in Sony without giving lower courts much guidance
on whether or when the Sony analysis remained viable. As the 1976 Act
aged, that problem arose more and more often. Courts have struggled to
figure out how fair use applies to new uses and new technologies.111
Efforts to gain more clarity from Congress, meanwhile, have largely
been stymied by legacy copyright owners’ insistence that Congress enact
no new express exemptions and privileges.

108. Id.
109. Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1990).
110. See Leval, supra note 22, at 1464. Judge Leval also observed that he agreed that the Court
had reached the right result in Sony: “Before leaving Sony, I wish to make clear that I do not suggest
it was incorrectly decided. I am wholly in agreement that production of the VTR [(video tape
recorder)] should not have been enjoined.” Id. at 1457. The Judge continued:
If it were enjoined because of its capacity to make infringing copies, why not also enjoin the
use of the camera, the audio-tape recorder, the photocopier, and the computer—perhaps even
pen and paper, or the printing press. All can be used to make infringing copies. The copyright
law could put us back in the middle ages. But the decision to deny relief was fully justified on
other grounds without need to launch a fundamental reinterpretation of fair use. As for the
question whether an infringement has occurred when a private person uses the VTR to timeshift a program for a one-time noncommercial viewing, that question falls in the same category
as the question whether infringement occurs when the waiters sing “Happy Birthday” at a
patron’s table, or when someone makes a photocopy of a New Yorker cartoon to put up on the
refrigerator. What category is that? Questions that never need to be answered. If it did need to
be answered, I believe the answer would be provided by the doctrine of de minimis non curat
lex—the law does not concern itself with trifles—a doctrine that is of great importance to a
proper understanding of the law of copyright.
Id. at 1457–58.
111. See, e.g., In re Aimster, 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,
239 F.3d 2004 (9th Cir 2001); Sega Enters., Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992);
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 321–25 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d sub
nom. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001); Kelly v. Arriba Soft
Corp., 77 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (C.D. Cal. 1999), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir.
2003); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’ns Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1378–82
(N.D. Cal. 1995).
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V.

PERSONAL USES, CONTRIBUTORY LIABILITY, AND
CONGRESS

In the years since the enactment of the 1976 copyright revision,
Congress has had many chances to revisit the question of consumer
liability for personal uses. It has amended the copyright law more than
fifty times, and held innumerable hearings on digital piracy, online
infringement, and peer-to-peer file sharing.112 Yet, until the 2003 John
Doe suits filed by record labels and motion picture producers, members
of Congress appear not to have anticipated that consumers might be
liable for making copies for personal uses.
When courts in the 1990s read § 106 rights expansively to reach
commercial activity that corresponded to common personal uses,
members of Congress read those decisions to apply to exploitative and
commercial acts without threatening consumers’ behavior.113 When the
Ninth Circuit held that a computer repair firm’s turning on a computer
infringed the § 106(1) reproduction right in the computer’s operating
system software,114 Congress amended the law to permit computer
maintenance and repair services to turn on their customers’
computers.115 It didn’t include a provision allowing consumers to turn on
their own computers, because of members’ assumption that consumers’
computer use did not violate copyright owners’ rights under § 106(1).116
When civil liberties groups lobbied for explicit consumer exemptions,
senators and representatives voiced skepticism that courts would hold
consumers liable for ordinary uses of copyrighted works.117 When
112. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 92: COPYRIGHT LAW OF THE UNITED STATES AND
RELATED LAWS CONTAINED IN TITLE 17 OF THE UNITED STATES CODE, at vi–xii (2011); see, e.g.,
Piracy of Intellectual Property on Peer-to-Peer Networks: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts,
the Internet, & Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2002) [hereinafter
2002 Piracy Hearing]; Music on the Internet: Is There an Upside to Downloading?: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (2000) [hereinafter 2000 Music on the Internet
Hearing].
113. See Jessica Litman, Lawful Personal Use, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1871, 1904–07 (2007).
114. MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peake Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 517–18 (9th Cir. 1993); see also
Joseph Liu, Owning Digital Copies: Copyright Law and the Incidents of Copy Ownership, 42 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1245, 1255–78 (2001); Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, WIRED, Jan.
1996, at 134.
115. Computer Maintenance Competition Assurance Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860,
2886 (1998).
116. See 144 CONG. REC. S4888–89 (1998) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft); id. at 4892–92 (remarks
of Sen. Grassley); 144 CONG. REC. H7092 (1998) (statement of Rep. Frank); 143 CONG. REC. E21
(Jan. 1, 1997) (statement of Rep. Knollenberg); Litman, supra note 113, at 1905 n.190.
117. See, e.g., Digital Media Consumers’ Rights Act of 2003: Hearing on H.R. 107 Before the
Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, & Consumer Protection of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce,
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Congress took up the question of contributory liability for infringing
material posted publicly by subscribers, it enacted safe harbors for
Internet service providers rather than oblige them to screen all files
posted to the Internet for infringing content.118 Having enacted a
provision to protect a particular class of services from liability for their
subscribers’ acts, Congress raised the minimum and maximum statutory
damages available for infringement.119 It did not otherwise revisit the
question of remedies to devise a measure for damages appropriate for
contributory infringers.
Three years later, in a report mandated by the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA), the Register of Copyrights proposed that
Congress enact a narrow statutory privilege to make temporary digital
copies incidental to an otherwise lawful use.120 Representatives of the
108th Cong. 46–47 (2004) (statement of Rep. Stearns); id. at 68–71 (colloquy); WIPO Copyright
Treaties Implementation Act; and Online Copyright Liability Limitation Act: Hearing on H.R. 2281
and H.R. 2180 Before the Subcomm. on Courts & Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997).
118. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, title II, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (Oct. 28,
1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512); see also 144 CONG. REC. S4888 (May 14, 1998) (remarks of
Sen. Ashcroft). Judge Edward Damich was a member of Senator Orrin Hatch’s staff while Congress
was considering the DMCA. Judge Damich told me that he had suggested to copyright owners and
Internet service providers that the statute should include language clarifying that individual
consumers were not liable for viewing infringing files over the Internet from their homes. Lobbyists
for copyright owners were unenthusiastic, and Internet service providers insisted that such language
would not be necessary, so long as the providers would not be held liable for consumers’
infringement. See Litman, supra note 26, at 30–31, 34 n.12.
119. The 1988 Berne Convention Implementation Act had amended § 504(c) by raising the
minimum statutory damages award from $250 per work infringed to $500 per work infringed, and
doubling the maximum awards from $10,000 per work for non-willful infringement and $50,000 per
work infringed for willful infringement to $20,000 and $100,000 per work infringed. Berne
Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853, 2860. In 1999,
Congress increased the minimum and maximum statutory damage awards again, to $750, $30,000,
and $150,000 per work infringed. Digital Theft Deterrence and Copyright Damages Improvement
Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-160, 113 Stat. 1774, 1774.
120. Section 104 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act had directed the Copyright Office to
study the question (among others) and to submit a report to Congress within two years. In the 2001
report, the Copyright Office noted sharp division between proponents of a broad privilege to make
ephemeral RAM (random access memory) copies incidental to lawful use and opponents of any
diminution in the scope of the reproduction right. Representatives of copyright owners had argued,
the Copyright Office reported, that it was inappropriate to enact any exception for the benefit of any
user interest that had not demonstrated concrete harm from the potentially overbroad application of
section 106. Computer repair services had demonstrated harm and Congress had accordingly
enacted a narrow exception. Since others had not yet been held liable for making RAM copies, any
statutory privilege was premature. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, DMCA SECTION 104 REPORT 50–
58 (2001), available at http://www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/dmca/sec-104-report-vol-1.pdf
[hereinafter DMCA SECTION 104 REPORT]. After examining testimony and written comments on
both sides, the Copyright Office had concluded that the scope of the exclusive reproduction right
was disputed:
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entertainment and software industries protested. Rather than arguing that
consumers who made such copies were or should be liable under current
law, opponents of the legislation warned that even a narrow privilege
might provide a loophole for future commercial piracy.121 As part of the
same Report, the Register noted that the literal language of the copyright
law appeared to prohibit the common and prudent practice of making
archival or backup copies of computer files and other digital content.122
Copyright owners, while acknowledging the mismatch between the
statutory language and widespread behavior, opposed any amendment of
the law to permit digital backups. They argued that since nobody had
sued consumers over backing up their hard drives, proponents of an
archival exception had failed to prove any harm from its absence.123
Adding an express exception for computer or other digital backups, they
insisted, would only encourage commercial software pirates to use the
exception as a bad faith justification for infringement.124 The Register
nonetheless recommended that Congress enact a modest change, either
enacting a limited privilege for digital backups, or limiting the uses that
could be made of backup files that were otherwise privileged under the
fair use doctrine.125 The entertainment software trade association
Nonetheless, a general rule can be drawn from the language of the statute. In establishing the
dividing line between those reproductions that are subject to the reproduction right and those
that are not, we believe that Congress intended the copyright owner’s exclusive right to extend
to all reproductions from which economic value can be derived.
Id. at 111. RAM copies, the Office concluded, should generally be deemed to be fixed within the
meaning of the statute and therefore potentially infringing. Id. at 112–23. There was, however, no
evidence that anyone was bringing copyright infringement suits against consumers for such
copying, and the Office had concluded that consumer RAM copies would generally be deemed noninfringing because of fair use or implied license. Id. at 124–45. The Register nonetheless supported
an amendment to clarify that no liability should attach to ephemeral copies that were incidental to
lawful music transmissions. Id.
121. Music industry representatives insisted that such an amendment would be inappropriate
since no showing of harm had been made. Software publishers protested that recognizing any
loopholes for any users would post grave piracy risks. See 2001 Section 104 Report Hearing, supra
note 15, at 76–83 (statement of Marvin Berenson, Broadcast Music, Inc.); id. at 17–23 (statement of
Carey Ramos, National Music Publishers Association); id. at 45–52 (statement of Emery Simon,
Business Software Alliance).
122. See DMCA SECTION 104 REPORT, supra note 120, at 150 (“Based on the evidence presented
during the course of preparing this Report, there is a fundamental mismatch between accepted,
prudent practice among most system administrators and other users, on one hand, and section 117
on the other. As a consequence, few adhere to the letter of the law.”)
123. Id. at 65, 151–52.
124. Id. at 61–63, 152.
125. The Copyright Office had concluded that, in the absence of an express archival exception,
hard disk backups were probably fair use. Id. at 158–59. If they were fair use, though, backup
copies would be deemed to have been “lawfully made,” and therefore potentially subject to the first
sale doctrine, which permits the owners of lawfully made copies to resell them or give them away.
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objected that the current statutory exception for back-up copies of
computer programs was itself no longer necessary, since software was
distributed on more durable media than it had been when Congress
enacted the original archival exception, and that the provision was
already being used as an excuse for ruinous piracy.126 Music copyright
owners expressed alarm that the statutory privilege might be expanded to
permit archival copies of music.127 No member of Congress introduced
an amendment to implement the Register’s proposal.
As recently as a decade ago, then, most members of Congress had no
reason to believe that their constituents’ ordinary noncommercial
copying, adaptation, distribution, performance, or display of material
protected by copyright would subject them to copyright infringement
suits. Although Congress had significantly expanded the scope of
copyright rights, it had done so against a background understanding that
the law did and should protect copyright owners’ ability to exploit their
works, while preserving the public’s liberties to read, listen, view, or use
those works, even when individual consumers made unlicensed copies
for personal use.128
Id. at 153–57; see also 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012). The Register’s Report therefore recommended
that Congress either enact a narrow archival privilege for backups that expressly prohibited the
distribution of backup copies, or amend the first sale doctrine to exclude any fair use copies from its
coverage. See id. at 157–61. Copyright owner lobbyists have steadfastly resisted proposals to
implement some analogue of the first sale doctrine for works in digital form. See 2014 First Sale
Under Title 1 Hearing, supra note 15, at 108–09 (2014) (testimony of Emery Simon, BSA, The
Software Alliance); id. at 138–50 (statement submitted by the Association of American Publishers).
Since the Supreme Court ruled in Kirtsaeng v. Wiley, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013), that
§ 109(a) applies to copies manufactured outside of the United States as well as to copies
manufactured within it, publishers have sought to persuade Congress to narrow the doctrine, see
2014 First Sale Under Title 17 Hearing, supra note 15, at 6 (testimony of Stephen Smith, John
Wiley & Sons, Inc.), and have urged the U.S. Trade Representative to negotiate trade agreements
repudiating the Supreme Court decision. See Margot Kaminski, The Capture of International
Intellectual Property Law Through the U.S. Trade Regime, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 977 (2014).
126. See 2001 Section 104 Report Hearing, supra note 15, at 183–86 (statement of Douglas
Lowenstein, Interactive Digital Software Association).
127. See id. at 80–83 (statement of Marvin Berenson, Broadcast Music, Inc.).
128. In 2002, the producers of censored versions of popular DVDs filed suit against film studios
seeking a declaratory judgment that their businesses were not infringing. The studios
counterclaimed for copyright infringement. Businesses that produced software designed to censor
objectionable content on DVDs intervened as counterclaimants and counter defendants, seeking a
declaration that their software, which did not require the distribution of copies of the censored films,
did not infringe the copyrights in the films. See CleanFlicks of Colorado, LLC, v. Soderbergh, 433
F. Supp. 2d 1236 (D. Colo. 2006). Representative Lamar Smith introduced a bill to allow families to
make objectionable content on DVDs imperceptible, so long as no fixed copy was made of the
altered film. H.R. 4586, 108th Cong. (2004). The Register of Copyrights testified that she believed
the manufacture and use of such software was completely legal. See The Family Movie Act:
Hearing on H.R. 4586 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, & Intellectual Prop. of the H.
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Those background assumptions changed when the widespread
adoption of peer-to-peer file sharing threatened to displace traditional
distribution systems. Copyright owners asserted that individual
consumers using networked digital technology posed a greater threat to
copyright than commercial pirates.129 Representatives of newfangled
services insisted that individuals using their services were making lawful
personal uses of protected content.130 Yet, neither members of Congress
nor copyright owners sought legislation that would address consumers’
unlicensed copying directly, or clarify the circumstances under which
personal copying would support infringement liability. Peer-to-peer
systems inspired the recording industry association to bring “John Doe”
suits against thousands of individual consumers.131 Most of the 30,000
John Doe suits settled without a trial, but the handful that were tried
resulted in jaw-dropping verdicts against individual users of peer-to-peer
file sharing software.132 At recent House Judiciary Committee hearings,
Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 7–8 (2004) [hereinafter 2004 Movie Act Hearing] (testimony
of MaryBeth Peters, Register of Copyrights). Jack Valenti testified for the Motion Picture
Association of America that while the studios had no objection to families’ fast forwarding through
objectionable content in the privacy of their homes, enacting the bill would both undermine the
copyright owners’ fundamental right to make derivative works and would give cover to companies
making profits from disfiguring the original vision of the movies’ creators. Id. at 67–68. Valenti
suggested that Congress should wait and see whether ongoing negotiations between film studios and
software companies might yield a licensing solution. Id. at 68. At no time was there any suggestion
that consumers might face lawsuits challenging their use of such software. Representative Smith
insisted that the legislation was necessary to protect software companies from the financial burden
of litigation. Id. at 2. Congress enacted the bill the following year as Title II of the Family
Entertainment and Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 109-9, 119 Stat. 223 (2005) (codified in relevant part
at 17 U.S.C. § 110(11) (2012)). The House Committee Report characterized the law as a
clarification of potential liability for companies that assisted parents in seeking to “control what
their children watch in the privacy of their own home.” H.R. REP. NO. 33, at 5 (2005). Thus, while
the statutory privilege is cast in terms of consumers’ private use, its impetus and justification was to
protect commercial businesses from liability for enabling those uses. The privilege does not extend
to making a fixed copy of the censored film for personal use. Title I of the Family Entertainment
and Copyright Act criminalized the unlicensed recording of a motion picture in a movie theater, and
set a penalty of three years imprisonment for a first offense and six years imprisonment for
subsequent offenses.
129. See 2002 Piracy Hearing, supra note 112, at 19–23 (statement of Hilary Rosen, Recording
Industry Association of America); id. at 102 (statement of National Music Publishers’ Association).
130. See 2000 Music on the Internet Hearing, supra note 112, at 16 (2000) (statement of Hank
Barry, Napster); id. at 22 (statement of Michael Robertson, MP3.com, Inc.); id. at 39 (statement of
Gene Kan, Infrasearch, Inc.).
131. See Arista Records, LLC v. Doe, 604 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2010); Sarah McBride & Ethan
Smith, Music Industry to Abandon Mass Suits, WALL ST. J., Dec. 19, 2008, at B1–2; Greg Sandoval,
RIAA’s Cary Sherman Says Lawsuits Were the Only Option, CNETNEWS.COM (Dec. 19, 2008, 4:38
PM), http://www.cnet.com/news/riaas-cary-sherman-says-lawsuits-were-the-only-option/.
132. See Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 719 F.3d 67, 72 (1st Cir. 2013) ($675,000);
Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 692 F.3d 899, 901 (8th Cir. 2012) ($1,920,000 reduced on
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critics of the verdicts urged Congress to revisit the statutory damages
provisions to adjust the range of damages to make them more nearly
proportional to the harm caused by infringement.133 Copyright owners
resisted any reduction; they insisted that statutory damages perform a
crucial deterrent function that is only possible when very large awards
are available.134
The John Doe suits, though, were a highly publicized sideshow;
mainstream copyright owners have largely abandoned them today.135
Copyright owners’ more important goal was to hold providers of Internet
services liable for consumers’ allegedly infringing activities. In 2005,
motion picture and music copyright owners succeeded in recovering
against Grokster, the proprietor of popular peer-to-peer file sharing
software, for inducing individual consumers to commit copyright
infringement.136 Copyright owners followed up that victory by filing
inducement suits against other distributors of peer-to-peer file sharing

appeal to $220,000); BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888, 889 (7th Cir. 2005) ($22,500 awarded
on summary judgment).
133. See Copyright Remedies: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop., & the
Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 65–67 (2014) [hereinafter Copyright
Remedies Hearing] (testimony of Sherwin Siy, Public Knowledge); id. at 51–53 (testimony of Matt
Schruers, Computer and Communications Industry Ass’n); The Scope of Copyright Protection:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop., & the Internet of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 113th Cong. 7, 20–21 (2014) (statement of David Nimmer, UCLA School of Law); id. at
116 (statement of Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Tulane University Law School).
134. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, DEP’T OF COMMERCE INTERNET POLICY TASK
FORCE, PUBLIC ROUNDTABLE PANEL DISCUSSION ON GREEN PAPER ON COPYRIGHT POLICY,
CREATIVITY, AND INNOVATION IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 97–98 (June 25, 2014) (statement of Jay
Rosenthal, National Music Publishers Association), available at http://www.uspto.gov/ip/
global/copyrights/GREEN_PAPER_ON_COPYRIGHT_POLICY_etc.PDF; id. at 90–91 (statement
of David Herlihy, Herlihylaw.com and Northeastern University); U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE,
ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSIONS ON REMIXES, STATUTORY DAMAGES AND DIGITAL FIRST SALE
DOCTRINE 17 (May 21, 2014) (remarks of Steven Marks, Recording Industry Association of
America), available at http://www.uspto.gov/ip/global/copyrights/roundtable_transcript-nashville14-06-10.pdf.
135. After five years, the Recording Industry Association of America announced it would end its
program of suing thousands of individual consumers for copyright infringement. See McBride &
Smith, supra note 131, at B7. The tactic had by then spread to the owners of copyrights in
independent films, pornographic films, and the Las Vegas Review Journal. See Copyright Trolls,
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/issues/copyright-trolls (last visited Jan. 5,
2015); Eriq Gardner, “Hurt Locker” Producer Nicolas Chartier on His Anti-Piracy Crusade and
Why Union Workers Need Less Pay, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Jan. 15, 2015),
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/hurt-locker-producer-nicolas-chartier-763982.
136. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005). Rebecca
Tushnet mused on the implications of the Grokster opinion for the VCR, iPod, and distributors of
BitTorrent software. See Rebecca Tushnet, REBECCA TUSHNET’S 43(B)LOG (June 27, 2005),
http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2005/06/this-is-copy-of-what-i-posted-at.html.
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software,137 Internet service providers,138 websites,139 user-generated
content sites,140 credit card companies,141 cloud storage businesses,142 a
satellite television company,143 and venture capital firms,144 with mixed
results. Courts have struggled to determine whether to attribute allegedly
actionable copying and other uses to consumers or to defendant
intermediaries.145 (This is another question the forty-year-old statute
understandably failed to address.) If the consumer is responsible for the
allegedly infringing acts, then the intermediaries’ liability turns on
whether the consumers’ acts should be deemed fair use.
By replacing a regime of detailed defined rights with one in which
copyright exclusive rights are defined broadly, subject to many detailed
express exceptions, Congress in 1976 increased the pressure on fair use
significantly. The only exceptions enacted as part of the 1976 Act were
those requested by lobbyists for particular user interests and assented to
by lobbyists for copyright owners.146 In the nearly forty years since then,

137. See, e.g., Arista Records, LLC v. Lime Group LLC, 784 F. Supp. 2d 398 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
138. See generally Steve Seidenberg, US Perspectives: ISPs in US Face New Copyright Attack,
INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Dec. 22, 2014), http://www.ip-watch.org/2014/12/22/isps-in-us-face-newcopyright-attack/.
139. See, e.g., Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Fung, 710 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2013).
140. See, e.g., Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012); Flava Works, Inc.
v. Gunter, 689 F.3d 754 (7th Cir. 2012).
141. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007).
142. See, e.g., Disney Enters. Inc. v. Hotfile Corp., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1303 (S.D. Fla. 2011);
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Rapidshare A.G., No. 09-CV-2596, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146053 (S.D. Cal.
2010); see also Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(discussing inducement claims against business that purported to facilitate the resale of digital music
downloads).
143. The complaint in Fox Broad. Co. v. Dish Network, L.L.C., 747 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2014),
alleged that Dish Network induced infringing copying by consumers by supplying digital video
recorders with commercial skipping capabilities. See Complaint at 17–18, Fox Broad. Co. v. Dish
Network, L.L.C., 747 F.3d. 1060 (9th Cir. 2014) (No. CV12-04529). The district court and the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded for the purpose of a preliminary injunction motion
that consumers’ use of the digital video recorders was fair, and Dish was therefore unlikely to be
liable for inducement. 747 F.3d at 1068–70; see also Dish Network, L.L.C. v. Am. Broad. Cos., No.
12-CV-4155, 2013 US Dist LEXIS 143492 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (discussing contributory infringement
counterclaims filed by ABC and CBS on the same facts).
144. See, e.g., UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., No. 07-CV-5744, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 70553, aff’d, 718 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2013).
145. See Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2512–13 (2014) (Scalia, J. ,
dissenting); Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008); Perfect 10,
Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007); Costar Group, Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc., 373
F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 2004); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’ns Servs., 907 F. Supp.
1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
146. See Litman, supra note 27.
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the only express exceptions added to the statute have been those
proposed by lobbyists for particular user interests and assented to by
lobbyists for copyright owners.147 Sometimes, even when everyone
agrees that the law no longer makes sense, copyright owner lobbyists
resist the enactment of any new exceptions or privileges, allegedly
because any new exception would vastly increase the risk of commercial
piracy.148 That requires courts, counsel, administrators, and individuals
to rely on ill-defined implicit privileges or exceptions, or to believe in a
generous and forgiving version of the fair use privilege.149
Congress has had many opportunities in the thirty years since Sony to
revisit the issues of personal use and contributory infringement. In the
decade when the Sony test held sway, Congress codified a consumer
personal copying privilege in the Audio Home Recording Act. In the
ensuing years, lobbyists for copyright owners have discouraged
Congress from enacting even narrow privileges for personal copying.150
In addressing the liability of Internet service providers for infringement
by subscribers, Congress enacted safe harbors insulating service
providers from liability for the infringement of third parties, but did not
take the opportunity to address what measure of damages might be
appropriate for service providers who exceeded those safe harbors.
Copyright owner lobbyists have resisted any suggestions to fill that
gap.151 Thus, the core problems that led the Sony Court to rule the way it
did remain unaddressed by intervening legislation.
It’s hard to avoid the inference that copyright owners hope to
discourage Congress from paying too much attention to the question of

147. See Litman, supra note 66.
148. See, e.g., 2001 Section 104 Report Hearing, supra note 15; see also supra notes 120–27 and
accompanying text.
149. It’s also worth reflecting that some of the recent copyright fair use decisions that have
attracted the most heated complaints would have been slam-dunk fair use cases under the standard
articulated in Sony. One rights holder representative compared the district court decision in Authors
Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014),
for example, to Plessy v. Ferguson, 63 U.S. 537 (1896), which notoriously upheld the
constitutionality of state segregation laws under the doctrine of “separate but equal.” See LIBRARY
OF CONG., ORPHAN WORKS AND MASS DIGITIZATION ROUNDTABLES 118 (2014) (statement of
Mickey
Osterreicher,
National
Press
Photographers’
Association),
available
at
http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/transcript/0311LOC.pdf.
Yet,
as
an
unambiguously
noncommercial use, HathiTrust’s activities would have been entitled to Sony’s presumption of
fairness.
150. See sources cited supra notes 117, 125, and 126.
151. See Copyright Remedies Hearing, supra note 133, at 75–76 (testimony of Nancy E. Wolff,
Cowan DeBaets Abrahams & Sheppard); id. at 116–24 (statement of Sandra Aistars, Copyright
Alliance).
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consumer liability for personal uses. All evidence suggests that members
of Congress believe that at least some and perhaps most personal uses
are non-infringing, and might enact an exemption into law if they were
pressed. The absence of a statutory provision leaves personal uses to the
fickle embrace of § 107. But representatives of public interest groups,
consumer groups, libraries, and educational institutions have gradually
come to agree that they prefer the current law to an explicit statutory
privilege.152 Fair use subjects them to significant uncertainty but
probably gives them broader leeway to make appropriate uses than any
amendment that copyright owner lobbyists would permit Congress to
enact.
The story surrounding secondary liability of Internet-related trumpet
makers is somewhat different. Copyright owners have actively sought,
but so far failed to secure, the enactment of statutes enabling them to
shut down services that allegedly facilitate infringement.153 One
important factor in the failure of the legislation has been copyright
owner lobbyists’ refusal to compromise on the terms of the law with the
businesses they were seeking to put out of business.154 Another was that
the overreaching provisions that copyright owners sought were
sufficiently extreme to inspire a rare, widespread public protest.155
Without a statutory fix, copyright owners have sued Internet
intermediaries directly, but are finding the statutory safe harbor and
consumers’ plausible fair use privilege to be significant obstacles.156
In the nearly forty years since Congress enacted the 1976 Copyright
Act, the rights of copyright owners have expanded markedly. Copyright

152. See The Scope of Fair Use Hearing, supra note 5, at 6–7 (testimony of Peter Jaszi, American
University); id. at 22–24 (statement of Naomi Novik, Organization for Transformative Works); id.
at 144–54 (statement of the Library Copyright Alliance).
153. See Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011); Protect IP Act of 2011, S. 968,
112th Cong. (2011); see generally AnneMarie Bridy, Copyright Policymaking as Procedural
Democratic Process: A Discourse-Theoretic Perspective of ACTA, SOPA and PIPA, 30 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 153 (2012).
154. See, e.g., Zoe Lofgren, Championing Technology and FreeSpeech in Congress Was
Lonely . . . But Not Anymore, in HACKING POLITICS: HOW GEEKS, PROGRESSIVES, THE TEA PARTY,
GAMERS, ANARCHISTS, AND SUITS TEAMED UP TO DEFEAT SOPA AND SAVE THE INTERNET 181,
181–88 (David Moon, Patrick Ruffini & David Segal, eds. 2013) [hereinafter HACKING POLITICS];
Patrick Ruffini, A Punch in the Gut, in HACKING POLITICS, supra, at 107–12.
155. See Tiffany Cheng, The Blackout, in HACKING POLITICS, supra note 154, at 158, 158–60.
156. See, e.g., UMG Recordings v. Veoh, 718 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2013); Viacom Int’l, Inc. v.
YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012); see also Fox Broad. Co. v. Dish Network L.L.C., No.
12-CV-4529, 2015 WL 1137593 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2015) (granting summary judgment to Dish
Network on claim that it induces infringing consumer copying of Fox programming because
consumers’ copying is fair use).
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owners’ demands for further expansion continue unabated. Meanwhile,
they raise strident objections to all proposals to add new privileges and
exceptions to the statute to shelter non-infringing uses that might be
implicated by their expanded rights. Copyright owners have used the
resulting uncertainty over the scope of liability for new uses to litigate
some new businesses into bankruptcy before their legality could be
determined.157 All of these developments push fair use to shelter new
uses and users. When copyright owners complain that fair use has
stretched beyond their expectations, they fail to acknowledge their own
responsibility for its growth.
CONCLUSION
When Congress enacted the 1976 Act, it apparently believed that
consumers’ personal copying would not subject them to liability for
copyright infringement under the new statute, but nothing in the
language of the statute made that understanding explicit. Congress did
not consider and did not provide for claims that making devices that
facilitate consumer infringement might subject device makers to
infringement liability. The Sony case, filed shortly after the Act’s
enactment, raised both questions. Confronted with a choice between
finding liability where Congress had not intended to impose it or
construing the statute to reach a narrower set of uses than the literal
language might warrant, the Supreme Court settled on a new formulation
of the fair use privilege that allowed it to avoid finding Sony liable for
consumers’ personal copying. That fair use analysis wreaked a lot of
mischief in the decade it controlled, chiefly by making it much more
difficult for commercial uses to claim their uses were fair. It also, for
good or ill, encouraged both consumers and businesses to structure their
interactions around the assumption that consumers’ personal copying
would normally be fair use. In 1994, the Court decided Campbell, and
replaced the analysis it had adopted in Sony with a test that focused
primarily on the transformativeness of the allegedly fair use. It left the
implications of that change for secondary liability and consumer
personal uses uncharted.
Meanwhile, Congress had enacted the Audio Home Recording Act,
articulating an exemption from liability for consumers’ noncommercial
copying of recorded music,158 but had not otherwise addressed the
157. See generally Litman, supra note 103; Jessica Litman, Antibiotic Resistance, 30 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L. J. 53 (2012).
158. See supra notes 97–103 and accompanying text.
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question of consumer liability for personal use. It had doubled the
statutory damages available for infringement,159 but had not tackled the
appropriate monetary relief for trumpet makers held contributorily liable
for the aggregate infringement of millions of consumers. After
Campbell, copyright owner lobbyists discouraged Congress from adding
any further express exceptions, privileges, or limitations to the statute,
and from reducing or moderating the statutory damages range. When
consumer advocates or the Copyright Office pointed out inconsistencies
between the literal words of the statute and common, non-infringing
consumer behavior, copyright owners insisted that the proponents of
new limitations had failed to make a compelling showing that the status
quo caused actual harm. If consumers were not being sued for their
activity, the fact that their behavior might be prohibited by a literal
reading of the language of the law, they insisted, harmed nobody.
Congress has a longstanding disinclination to enact copyright laws over
the opposition of major copyright lobbies,160 and has not been motivated
to disregard that opposition in order to clarify either the scope of
consumer liability for personal copying or the contours of contributory
infringement.
Copyright rights have expanded and will probably continue to
expand. Advocates for copyright owners resist any proposal to
incorporate specific privileges and exceptions into the statute to
privilege uses that Congress deems non-infringing. They warn that any
new privilege or exception poses a grave risk that future pirates will
make use of the privileges to shield wrongful behavior. The uncertainty
surrounding consumer liability, moreover, is itself a weapon that can be
deployed against newfangled trumpet makers and the venture capital
firms that might fund them. With no specific exceptions, though, courts
have little recourse but to construe fair use as expansively as they have
recently construed copyright rights. And that is very expansively indeed.

159. See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853,
2860. In 1999, the Digital Theft Deterrence and Copyright Damages Improvement Act increased
statutory damages yet again. Digital Theft Deterrence and Copyright Damages Improvement Act of
1999, Pub. L. No. 106-160, 113 Stat. 1774.
160. See generally Litman, supra note 27.

